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INTERVIEW

OF

MAJ. GENERAL PETER DEVLIN
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL (CANADIAN)

MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

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18 JUNE 2007

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BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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P R O C E E D I N G S

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This is

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the Multinational Corps-Iraq Historian. Today is Monday, the 18th of June 2007. I am here at the Al Faw Palace, Headquarters for Multinational Corps-Iraq outside of Baghdad, Iraq; and I am here interviewing Major General Peter Devlin, who is the -- from the Canadian Army, who is the Deputy Commanding General for Coalition Issues.

Sir, could you go ahead and introduce yourself in your own voice?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Sure. My name is Major General Peter Devlin. I am on exchange from the Canadian Army to III Corps in Fort Hood, Texas, and as a result of that exchange program, I am fortunate enough to be here in Iraq with Multinational Corps-Iraq which is currently led by III Corps.

As you know, (b)(3), (b)(6) there are three Deputy Commanding Generals for MNCI, Multinational Corps-Iraq: General Berragan, who is responsible for the operations; General Simmons, U.S., responsible for Title 10, the separates, which is aviation and support issues; and myself, Coalition and Infrastructure with dividing half my time

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1 between Coalition issues and the other half with critical
2 Iraqi infrastructure, mainly centered on oil and electricity.

3 (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Thank you, sir. Just to
4 get some background, can you tell me a little bit about the
5 piece in terms of your normal billet as the Exchange Officer
6 with III Corps back at Fort Hood? When were you first
7 assigned there?

8 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I arrived in Fort Hood in
9 the summer of 2005. So it will be two years this summer, two
10 years now actually, that I have been with III Corps, and a
11 great opportunity professionally, personally, to soldier as
12 part of a Corps and part of a U.S. Corps.

13 My duties in Fort Hood are mainly centered on
14 being forward with the TAC on exercises such as Ultra Focus
15 Lens (Phonetic) in Korea and the RSOI exercise. Full Eagle,
16 I think it's called. And so I would deploy forward with the
17 Corps HQ in support of those exercises, as an example, and I
18 also have a lot to do with the community, the uniformed and
19 the civilian communities in Fort Hood. I have a wonderful
20 place to live and wonderful place to be with my family, as I
21 am there with my family as well.

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Sir, to look at that

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1 split in duties, I wonder first, if I could, kind of ask some
2 questions about the Coalition piece as background to the
3 structure piece.

4 Can you give me a picture as to when you first
5 arrived here, what was the situation with the array of our
6 Coalition partners, and has that changed so far during the
7 course of III Corps' assignment as the command element for
8 Multinational Corps?

9 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I've been here for seven
10 months now, and I think that the major change -- I don't
11 think there's been any big change from a Coalition part.
12 There's been the evolution or the growth and the continued
13 progress of the mission that has caused some adjustment on
14 behalf of the Coalition partners.

15 So I arrived with a Coalition population on the
16 boat, 15,000, and over the seven, eight months that I have
17 been here, it's dropped to about 13,000.

18 That drop, though, is the result of nations
19 adjusting the contribution based on the national -- their own
20 national interest as well as support for Iraq back home, and
21 the biggest adjustments have been on the part of the British
22 and the Koreans.

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1 So I would tell you that, in my opinion, support
2 for the mission from a military point of view is strong, but
3 from a political point of view it is somewhat fragile. So
4 these nations, the 26 nations that are part of the Coalition
5 here, have a challenge in balancing the support for the
6 mission domestically with their efforts here, and for most of
7 them, their efforts in Afghanistan where there is much more
8 and a much broader level of support back in their home
9 nations than there is for the effort here in Iraq.

10 So some of the adjustments in numbers have been
11 not so much a loss for the bigger effort. They have been a
12 loss for the effort here in Iraq, because these nations have
13 decided to concentrate their efforts in Afghanistan.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6) You mentioned the U.K. and the
15 ROK. Just to capture that, what have we seen in terms of
16 reduction in their strength?

17 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: The British have gone down
18 -- or will have gone down by the end of the summer about
19 2,000. So they are still in the midst of dropping their
20 numbers.

21 Now some of that, I have to emphasize, is based
22 on their own consolidation efforts. So they have closed some

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1 of the FOBs that they have operated and consolidated some of
2 their functions. So there's been some efficiencies that they
3 have been able to gain, as well as reducing the number of
4 combat troops. So it is important to emphasize that.

5 The Koreans, the ROK forces have gone down
6 roughly 700 or 800 over this past eight months, and again
7 that is by the end of the summer here as to where they will
8 be at.

9 (b)(3), (b)(6) We also have some plus-ups
10 coming in some Coalition partners, though, if I'm not
11 mistaken.

12 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Yes.

13 (b)(3), (b)(6) What is on the -- What is in the
14 process there, and what do we see as far as new players?

15 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: The Georgians would be the
16 one that I would highlight. Georgia has committed to the
17 contribution of a Georgian brigade, brigade minus, 2000
18 soldiers, which is very significant, given Georgia is a
19 country with a three-brigade army, and they have committed
20 one of their brigades -- I should say that they have
21 committed 2,000 soldiers for a year here in Iraq.

22 For them, what that will mean is two of their

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1 three brigades will have been cycled through the theater, and
2 their other brigade having more of a peacekeeping emphasis
3 has been a force that has been providing a battalion, which
4 provides middle-ring security for the U.N. in the
5 International Zone, and they have had a battalion that has
6 operated in Multinational Division-North area based out of
7 Fad Warhorse (Phonetic) for the past several (Inaudible).

8 So it is a significant commitment on behalf of
9 Georgia, but the U.S. does absolutely remarkable things at
10 supporting countries like Georgia.

11 So you have a military that will undergo some
12 great training, will undergo some -- a modernization program
13 in terms of kitting, will have training both in Georgia and
14 in Europe and in Kuwait before they move up into the Wasit
15 area and will operate out of Camp Delta, will operate as part
16 of Multinational Division-Center, and when they reach their
17 full operational capability, which is tentatively scheduled
18 for September of this year, there will have been a tremendous
19 amount of growth in the Georgian Army in terms of their PPPs,
20 in terms of their equipment, in terms of their capability to
21 operate in a COIN environment.

22 So it's a good thing for the Coalition, but I

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1 would also argue it's a great thing for Georgia.

2 It's a great thing for many of the other
3 countries that participate here at the battalion and company
4 level, in that they are able to make contributions to the
5 transformation of their militaries from a conventional force
6 to a more modern, a more versatile, a more flexible force,
7 which is better able to deal with the threats today, and
8 these are international threats as well as threats that they
9 deal with domestically.

10 So a great deal for the U.S., a great deal for
11 the Coalition, and I would submit a good deal for these
12 countries that participate as well.

13 (b)(3), (b)(6) How many Coalition partners are
14 there, all told, right now? Do you know?

15 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Twenty-six.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) I know I have that in the
17 statistics somewhere, but it's always good to get that.

18 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: And roughly 13,000
19 soldiers.

20 (b)(3), (b)(6) You talked about the training
21 and equipment piece. Is that relationship worked out
22 differently for every Coalition partner? Is there a

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1 negotiation process, if you are privy to that? If you are
2 not, then that's fine. We'll skip over that. I'm just
3 wondering, if a country says, hey, we'd like to do this, but
4 we are going to need X, how is that process driven?

5 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I don't know all the inter-
6 notes about that. It's done through CENTCOM, but yes, there
7 is -- Country X approaches the U.S. or the U.S. approaches
8 Country X and says, hey, have you thought about - have you
9 thought about contributing some forces to the effort in Iraq,
10 and they go, yeah, except for we have some challenges,
11 whether those be financial or they be lift, whether they be
12 equipping or they be uniforms and personal protective gear.

13 All those things are talked about between the
14 U.S. government and Government X. They come to an agreement,
15 and Georgia would be a great example. So it's U.S. strategic
16 lift. It's U.S. personal protective equipment, including
17 things like gas masks. It is U.S. vehicles. It's U.S.
18 purchased counter-IED and electronic warfare gear, U.S.
19 purchased radios.

20 So it is a remarkable commitment on behalf of the
21 U.S. to support a partner like Georgia, and I salute Georgia,
22 too, for having the strength and the courage and the

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1 commitment to combat terror here in Iraq, and they have their
2 own challenges domestically as well that they are dealing
3 with.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you know, sir, is there a --
5 You may or may not have visibility on this. Realizing some
6 of these things are intangibles and transportation, training
7 -- I guess we start to get in a gray area with regard to
8 personal protective gear, vehicles, radio equipment.

9 Are these things that we are providing them with
10 in theater, and they leave in theater or is there -- Do you
11 have visibility on whether those agreements are, okay, yes,
12 we are going to give you personal protective gear, and you
13 get to keep that, or is there -- Is that something you have
14 visibility on?

15 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I'm not certain with my
16 answer here. I do believe that the major bits of kit,
17 vehicles and radios stay in theater. It would be the
18 clothing and next-to-skin type items which would go back to
19 Georgia or would go back to Country X with the soldiers.

20 (b)(3), (b)(6) Taking over your duties both as
21 the Coalition and infrastructure roles, did General Odierno
22 have some unique guidance for you, especially in terms of you

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1 having already been a member of the staff and then coming
2 over here? Just can you reflect back on when he looked at
3 you said, okay, I need you to take charge of this piece? Did
4 he have some initial guidance for you on what he was hoping
5 to have you provide the most emphasis on or what his thoughts
6 were?

7 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: General Odierno is a
8 marvelous commander who is here at the right time, the right
9 guy, and is tremendously operationally focused. So General
10 O. fights the fight at the operational and tactical level and
11 essentially said, Devlin, just go forth and manage the
12 Coalition. And that's what I do, and that's the overall
13 guidance that he provided to me, and I respect the fact that
14 he has a focus, certainly at the operational and strategic
15 level, tactically as well, and his energy and his drive is
16 focused operationally, and he also has great confidence in
17 his Division Commanders, all the Division Commanders who have
18 Coalition elements as part of their formations. So he allows
19 all that to take place based on whether you are a Division
20 Commander or whether you are a Deputy looking after the
21 Coalition from a Corps point of view.

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) How does he like to work as a

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1 commander, given that relationship, with you, with the other
2 Deputy Commanding Generals? How often does he like to meet
3 with you? What's the methodology of that? Is it more formal
4 or informal? How do you find -- What's the methodology of
5 you providing him feedback on the issues that you have
6 responsibility for, and how does he like to have that happen?

7 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: He has a huddle every
8 single day. So any thoughts that he has or any thoughts that
9 the Deputies have is shared in that forum.

10 He has also, in my opinion, the appropriate
11 reliance on the staff to do what the staff is supposed to be
12 doing, and so I think that there is the respect for the
13 staff, a very appropriate respect for the staff, both by
14 General O. as well as by his Deputies, not to become -- not
15 to trounce on their efforts as well.

16 So within the C-3 world there is a couple of
17 folks that work Coalition issues. So if there was something
18 specific that he was after -- for instance, the most current
19 timeline in support of a Georgian deployment -- he would not
20 look at me and go, Devlin, what's the most current timeline.
21 He would look at the 3 and say, I would like one of the
22 current planners' updates to be given the most current update

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1 of the timeline on the deployment of the Georgians.

2 So I think that there is a strong -- There is a
3 strong relationship between General O. and his Deputies. I
4 think it is -- There are formal aspects to it as well as
5 informal aspects. I would also say that the staff are
6 appropriately involved in all the discussions as well.

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) Looking to the other side on
8 infrastructure, is there regular collaboration between your
9 oversight role in that and issues that -- because I know the
10 C-3 and C-9. There's several people that all have a lot of
11 interest in things like electricity and the oil.

12 Is there a process by which there is a -- those
13 members of the staff are interfacing with you per se, or how
14 does that tend to happen?

15 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Your term oversight is a
16 great term, and that's probably the best -- a great term. So
17 oversight over infrastructure stuff.

18 It is an extremely complex area, and the staffs
19 do a great job at that, remembering that the Corps is in the
20 position sandwiched between the Force that deals with the
21 Ministries on a great or regular basis, and the Divisions
22 that are the landowners deal with the Governors and have the

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1 troops that are doing the marvelous work on the ground, not
2 only the Coalition troops but also the strong relationships
3 with the ISF, whether they are the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi
4 Police and, in many cases, the FPS forces, the Facility
5 Protection Services.

6 In the case of oil, the OPF, the Oil Protection
7 Forces, and electricity, the EPSS, the Electricity Protection
8 -- the Electrical Protection Security Services.

9 So the Corps is sandwiched in the middle. The C-
10 7 Cell looks after the technical side of infrastructure, and
11 it's the 3 side that looks after the security aspects, and
12 there is strong cooperation there.

13 I meet regularly, and it's not only several times
14 a week, but we have a more formal session once a week where
15 those that are involved in infrastructure sit down with me
16 and tell me what's happening. I give them my thoughts and my
17 guidance.

18 I have good relationships with the Assistant
19 Division Commanders that are involved in the infrastructure
20 world. It's normally the ADCSs, so the Assistant Division
21 Commanders for Support, with the Divisions that are tasked to
22 look after infrastructure from the Divisions, and that's the

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1 mechanism within the Corps and there are a number of
2 biorhythm events with the Force and with the Ministry folks
3 and with a recently created cell called Energy Fusion Cell
4 that has LNOs from the Corps that work with this Force cell,
5 which is aimed at synchronizing the efforts of different
6 Ministries to provide energy to the people of Iraq as well as
7 facilitating the export of oil that is so critical to the GDP
8 and the economy of Iraq.

9 (b)(3), (b)(6) Just so I understand that, sir,
10 the Energy Fusion Cell, which I had heard about that, that is
11 a Force element? We are players in that?

12 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: It is a Force cell
13 commanded and led by MNF-1. Supposed to have -- It is still
14 finding its place. It's still growing.

15 The vision is that they are our Ministry
16 representatives that are permanently part of the Energy
17 Fusion Cell: Ministry of Electricity, Oil, Transportation,
18 to name a few. And so it's all about synchronizing the
19 efforts, because the way things are, there is sometimes
20 competition between mainly oil and electricity.

21 An example would be oil providing fuel to service
22 Ministry of Electricity generators. So it costs the Ministry

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1 of Oil fuel, but Ministry of Electricity benefits; and those
2 types of conflicts need to be managed with the assistance of
3 the Coalition.

4 So it is definitely a Government of Iraq issue,
5 but it is one that we help facilitate. We make
6 recommendations, but it's much better when those
7 recommendations have been developed from a team which
8 includes Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Electricity folks.

9 (b)(3), (b)(6) Very interesting. It's
10 interesting to hear that comment, having watched the bureaus
11 and seen that (Inaudible) -- oh, no electricity.

12 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: And it is a real dilemma
13 here. Every single day, there are conflicts. I don't mean
14 that word in terms of personal conflicts, but there is a
15 conflict between the energy that's generated from oil and the
16 energy that's generated from electricity and who is paying
17 what to who, and how these Ministries are measured in the
18 eyes of the Government of Iraq.

19 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, changing gears back to the
20 Coalition side, just in observing some of the operational
21 things, the MND-Central-South seems to be having more
22 challenges just in the last couple of months in terms of an

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1 increase in the level of attacks they are seeing.

2 Any sense for how do we work with a Coalition
3 partner in terms of helping manage expectations and results
4 in a combat environment?

5 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: That's a big question,
6 (b)(3), (b)(6) an excellent question.

7 (Inaudible) challenges are the result of how they
8 are manned and equipped, and they are the result of Operation
9 Fardel Kanoun (Phonetic), which as a result of the efforts in
10 Baghdad have pushed mainly JAM elements south into the
11 Codicea (Phonetic) Province, the Diwaniya area and have
12 thrown out of balance the Shia forces, the Bader (Phonetic)
13 and the JAM balance that existed before Fardel Kanoun
14 (Phonetic) in Diwaniya.

15 So more JAM folks than Bader (Phonetic) folks,
16 more tension, more conflict, more violence, which resulted in
17 Operation Black Eagle which was a Coalition effort that saw a
18 U.S. brigade-minus, essentially a U.S. battalion with a
19 command and control element of a brigade HQ and some other
20 enablers go down into the Center-South effort, mainly in the
21 Codicea (Phonetic) Province, and deal with the JAM folks in
22 that area.

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1 It was -- The approach was much the same as we
2 see in Baghdad, the clear control retained, the establishment
3 of joint security stations, but we are in a competition for
4 forces. And so the operation took place. It was successful,
5 and then those valuable U.S. combat forces were needed
6 elsewhere to continue the battle against the enemy.

7 So the number of forces available within Center-
8 South went down. They have ROE and use of force challenges
9 that are -- from the U.S. that limit their approach in that
10 they are less aggressive. They are less -- and they have
11 less of an offensive spirit than U.S. elements, and as a
12 result of that, some of the progress that had been made with
13 Operation Black Eagle -- we have lost some of that progress.

14 We are not back to where it was, but we have
15 definitely taken some steps backwards, and the arrival of the
16 Georgians, the concentration of Center-South forces in
17 Codicea (Phonetic) Province, and Wasit Province being handed
18 over to Multinational Division Center led by 3 ID is a good
19 thing.

20 It's a good thing for the Coalition and,
21 hopefully, it will allow enough -- It will allow more forces
22 in Diwaniya to be able to have the presence that is necessary

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1 in the Joint Security Stations.

2 There were supposed to be two established. One
3 has been established. One is permanently manned. The other
4 one has yet to -- has not been built yet and, obviously, is
5 not yet manned.

6 So difficulties working with the police,
7 difficulties working with 8th Iraqi Army, difficulties with
8 the Governor and the Police Chief who are the Province. And
9 so it's a combination of many issues, (b)(3), (b)(6) that have
10 challenged the efforts in Codicea (Phonetic) Province:
11 Threat and limited number of troops, the equipment.

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14 1.4b
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16 1.4b But some of that is tied up in the offensive
17 spirit, which is less in Center-South than you would find in
18 a U.S. Division, all part of being part of a Multinational
19 Force, all part of managing a team.

20 So that would be one of the negative things of
21 being part of a Multinational team, but I would argue with
22 anyone that there are more benefits that come from being part

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1 of a Coalition and being part of a Multinational team.

2 Those benefits are tied to different approaches,
3 based on different cultures and different histories,
4 different equipment which can be employed in unique and novel
5 ways, greater understanding, a team approach, and lasting
6 relationships that are extremely difficult to put a price on.

7 You know, I think that the U.S. people should
8 look at a response that President Bush got last week when he
9 visited as an example of the relationships that develop
10 between countries often as a result of shared military
11 experiences.

12 The Albanians that are here do marvelous work.
13 There is a large company that is here. they are hard
14 soldiers. They are very devoted to what they do, and part of
15 that involvement in a U.S. led team here, I would submit to
16 you, has had a lot to do with the strengthening of the
17 relationship between Albania and the U.S.

18 So those are some of the things that are the
19 great things and the benefits that come from being part of a
20 Coalition, and every now and then there are the frustrations,
21 like we have dealing in Codicea, Diwaniya right now with
22 Center-South, and there is a balance, and that is what we do.

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1 We manage that balance.

2 (b)(3), (b)(6) I'm glad you talked about that,
3 and I really -- because in looking at your background, you
4 really have a unique perspective you can bring, one that kind
5 of -- I'm going to take you to a slightly different direction
6 on that, which is: You have these experiences in various
7 joint and Coalition type environments before.

8 How do you compare what you observe here in this
9 Coalition compared to your other experiences in places like
10 the former Yugoslavia and Europe, those sorts of things? Is
11 this -- What's unique about this Coalition environment?

12 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: What I see here more than I
13 have seen in my other lives has been that there is a stronger
14 integration of Coalition into the forces than I have seen in
15 the past where we dealt with coalitions based on boundaries
16 and based on very well defined tasks.

17 As we -- I say we. I mean, the U.S. and NATO and
18 other international organizations, the U.N., have become more
19 experienced and more comfortable with coalition operations,
20 we are willing to accept the risks of integrating coalition
21 forces into formations that in the past we dealt with that
22 risk with boundaries and with tasks.

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1 If I were to look at Multinational Division-
2 Baghdad as an example, the Estonians are fully integrated
3 into a U.S. battalion, and they undertake tasks as a U.S.
4 element in that battalion, and there are no lines on a map
5 that define the Estonian AO. It is a U.S. battalion, a U.S.
6 brigade AO, and the Estonians are part of that U.S. team.

7 I think that it's a good thing that we have moved
8 to that level of understanding, that level of confidence in
9 coalition operations, that level of operations that we've
10 grown over time and with greater understanding and with
11 greater confidence, and willing to accept that risk as well.

12 So that would be my answer, my comments to that
13 question.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6): Given these challenges and my
15 suspicions, I'm sure there are probably commanders of
16 Coalition forces here that are probably in something of a
17 dilemma because they have their home country political
18 guidelines. They have different rules of engagement that
19 they are aligned to follow.

20 Is one of your roles -- Do you find yourself
21 being a sounding board for coalition partners' frustrations
22 with trying to bridge those gaps or not?

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1 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Yes, often. And my
2 philosophy, I think, very much consistent with General O.
3 telling me to go forth and be good with the Coalition, is
4 just to work quietly behind the scenes to deal with senior
5 national representatives from all the different countries who
6 try to balance their commitment to combat here with their
7 national desires back home.

8 That might be an upcoming federal election. That
9 might be the fact that there are changes that are happening
10 in boundaries or command and control relationships that are
11 adjusted in a very delicate fashion without having to go back
12 for national approval back home, because if we did that, it
13 would result in the end of that nation's commitment to this
14 mission.

15 So, yes, (b)(3), (b)(6) it's done on a regular basis.
16 It's done quietly. It's often a sit-down, a venting. Then
17 sometimes it's, you know, here's the cold, hard truth, and we
18 need to manage that, and we manage it with supporting
19 relationships sometime.

20 An example of that would be with the adjustments
21 that are taking place in MND-Center-South and Center, some
22 countries have had their commitment to Iraq based on a

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1 command and control relationship with Poland as the lead
2 nation for Center-South, but they will be staying and
3 operating in MND-Center's AO. So they will be still
4 commanded and controlled by Poland, who will have a supported
5 -- who will be the supporting force supporting MND-Center for
6 that nation's commitment of a EOB platoon; and sometimes it's
7 just to have the realization in other nations that they are
8 very risk averse to casualties at this particular time,
9 because there is an upcoming federal election, and they
10 don't want to -- The military just wants the Coalition to be
11 aware that it's a sensitive time back home, and casualties
12 would jeopardize that nation's commitment to the mission.

13 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) It's a very complex job.

14 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: It's a very interesting
15 job. It's rewarding. There is no better job here in
16 theater, to be quite honest with you. But I love what I do.

17 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask something
18 totally different, sir, which exists again because of your
19 unique relationship with III Corps prior to coming here.

20 In the work-up process and also in the ongoing
21 fight of the war, I happen to have overheard that you are the
22 liaison, for instance, to some of the think tank people that

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1 sometimes come to theater.

2 I'm just wondering: As you observed the Corps
3 get ready to come back to the fight here and to assume
4 responsibility, and given that MNCI and MNFI, because their
5 commanders are going in a different direction because of the
6 surge this time -- Looking back on that whole process, do you
7 see that -- the staff or future managers -- has there been a
8 particular theory on warfare, a particular group of think
9 tank experts that the Corps has looked toward to be ones that
10 they tend to put a lot of faith in or draw from at least as a
11 source for planning out the strategy of the fight right now?

12 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: A great question. I think
13 that -- I don't know whether the Corps did anything
14 particularly special. I think that the Joint Forces Command
15 and the DCTP or the Army BCTP program, Battle Command
16 Training Program, if I have that acronym correct -- I'm not
17 exactly sure -- did a wonderful job at preparing the Corps to
18 come back over here.

19 I'd like to key on the word "come back over
20 here," because I think the biggest -- or not necessarily the
21 biggest, but one of the concerns is coming back here, and
22 that you come back to a theater with a past vision and past

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1 expectations.

2 I think the real challenge for any military and
3 any commander is to make sure that they don't live in the
4 past and that they are living today with an eye to the
5 future, and I think that there was a conscious effort on
6 behalf of General O. and his team not to be stuck in the
7 past, and in General O.'s case not to be stuck as Commander,
8 4 ID, but to be living as Commander, III Corps, getting ready
9 to take over from V Corps, and to develop a training program
10 that respected that approach.

11 I found that the contribution of V Corps to III
12 Corps' training was extraordinary, and General Corelli
13 (Phonetic) was very giving of his key staff to come over and
14 educate and develop the III Corps staff.

15 In fact, (b)(3), (b)(6) I would also say, one of the great
16 things for me personally and professionally was to leave
17 before III Corps did, two months before III Corps.

18 So I've been here since October, a couple of
19 months. So I was able to see V Corps work, which was
20 awesome, a great Corps with great leaders. I was able to be
21 part of the RIP process, Relief in Place, and to transition
22 from V Corps to III Corps.

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1 I hope that I was able to provide some value to
2 III Corps as they had completed their training and were in
3 the final throes of getting ready to come over here, because
4 I was already on the ground, and there was a large liaison
5 team from III Corps that was already here.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) Were you tasked then with
7 heading that liaison team?

8 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: No. No, no. It was -- I
9 came over early, because I took over from an Italian who was
10 leaving theater, and I had to be here to take a handover from
11 the Italian, and that was just by luck for me that he left,
12 that I arrived, and I had the opportunity to soldier with V
13 Corps, aid in the transition of III Corps, and then work as
14 part of III Corps' team.

15 So I think that we did some good training. I
16 don't think we did anything overly special. The Joint Forces
17 Command and the Army's training regime to ready a Corps is
18 sound. As long as you are living today with an eye to the
19 future, I think that you are well placed.

20 We do have some organizations that are new, the
21 Red Team Cell which, to be honest with you, I don't think
22 that we fully exploit to their full potential. That would

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1 just be my observation.

2 I think that the Army needs to relook at the
3 whole title, Red Team, because it has a connotation that
4 surrounds it which is not at all what their real potential
5 is. > their potential is to be looking at other approaches,
6 and because they are titled Red Team, we think of them as the
7 bad guys approach, and it's all tied to the past gaming and
8 that, and we need to move forward.

9 Part of that moving forward, (b)(3), (b)(6) is the Army
10 needs to title the Red Team something different, and that is
11 part of why we have not taken advantage of the full potential
12 of the Red Team Cell that we currently have within the Corps.

13 I think this is the first time that the Corps --
14 that a Multinational Corps-Iraq has had a Red Team that has
15 been part of it.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) What is their task?

17 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I think their task is to
18 challenge the approach that the Corps is moving along, to see
19 if it's sound, to explore branches off the plan, to give
20 thought to sequels. And, yes, there is the Plans Cell which
21 does that, too.

22 So I don't think that there is competition here

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1 at all. They complement each other. So the Corps' Plans
2 Cell needs to be complemented by the Red Team, and the Red
3 Team needs to be looking toward the future, challenging their
4 Corps' approach, looking sequels, looking branches, and
5 looking for different approaches.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, I've been asking a lot of
7 questions. Are there areas that I haven't touched on that
8 you are thinking, hey, he's the historian, and he didn't ask
9 me about this?

10 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: You know, I deal with the
11 Coalition. I deal with infrastructure stuff. I also am
12 blessed just to be able to see what's happening across the
13 theater here.

14 You know, we've been here for four years. I
15 haven't been here before. So I don't have a detailed
16 understanding of the past, but I would tell you, (b)(3), (b)(6) that
17 the investment in the government of Iraq is so critical to
18 the future, and I don't know whether we, the Coalition and
19 the U.S., has had the appropriate investment in the
20 government of Iraq over the past number of years.

21 I would just say that. That's the future.
22 That's the key to having a country that is able to stand up

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1 on its own, not as a little mini-U.S., not as -- just as an
2 independent country which is a friend in the region, which
3 has a style of government that is acceptable to the U.S., and
4 has enjoyed the confidence of the people.

5 So we need to invest in that. We need to invest
6 tremendously in that, and there is a balance between doing
7 stuff and supporting the government of Iraq. Reconciliation
8 would be the most current example of that, and MNCI and MNFI
9 needs to be careful as they balance the reconciliation
10 efforts around doing things for the government of Iraq and
11 for the people of Iraq, and supporting the government of Iraq
12 in their efforts at reconciliation.

13 That balance is tied to time. So that's why there
14 is such a balancing act and a very challenging, difficult
15 balancing act, because there is only so much time. That time
16 is based on the support of the American people and
17 governments across the world that are part of the Coalition
18 here, but you have to be cognizant of the time, cognizant of
19 the government of Iraq, and cognizant of your task and
20 balance it so that you are not necessarily doing it, but you
21 are supporting the government of Iraq.

22 I don't mean to suggest for a moment that the end

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1 of June '07 here that we are doing too much on the
2 reconciliation front ourselves, the Force and the GIM and FI.
3 I just believe that we need to make sure that we have the
4 government of Iraq's support, make sure that they are the
5 ones that are supportive of these efforts, and I could use
6 that with reconciliation. I could use it with
7 infrastructure.

8 So the fact that the Energy Fusion Cell says that
9 it is important for the Beji (Phonetic) oil refinery to have
10 an independent power source, that needs to be what the
11 government of Iraq thinks; and the Ministry of Electricity
12 and the Ministry of Oil need to say, hey, it's important,
13 darn it, that we have an independent power source for the
14 Baji oil refinery.

15 The uncontrolled shutdowns and blackouts that
16 happen in the north are no longer acceptable. It costs us
17 too much, and that cost being the damage to equipment and the
18 loss of revenue that comes from the flow of crude and product
19 is no longer worth it. But that's true enough. I'll just
20 use it as an example, but there needs to be that balance, and
21 there needs to be the government of Iraq support for all this
22 stuff so that it is --

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1 Now we don't as a Coalition get frustrated by an
2 independent government who is trying to stand up on their
3 own.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, we are at the end of our
5 time. I appreciate your time with me.

6 Are there any last comments on your part?

7 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: No. I'm grateful for the
8 opportunity to make some comments. It's a great place to be.
9 I'm honored to be part of MNCI, tremendously honored.

10 There are some fantastic soldiers. There's some
11 fantastic leaders doing incredible things in this country.
12 I'm a half-full glass kind of guy, and so I have a reasonable
13 amount of optimism for what's happening here, what's
14 happening with the government of Iraq, what's happening with
15 the Coalition.

16 I think, whether or not there is the patience and
17 the support in countries across the globe for what is
18 happening here, I hope that there is that level of patience
19 to allow us to get over a hill or to arrive at a level of
20 stability here, stability in terms of an acceptable level of
21 violence and an acceptable capability with the government of
22 Iraq, and the confidence from the people of Iraq that we can

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1 -- that they can continue to move the country forward in a
2 way that is acceptable to the people of Iraq. And of course,
3 I think it also has to be acceptable to the members of the
4 Coalition.

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) Thank you, sir. That concludes
6 this interview.

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